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Abstract: To achieve security in wireless sensor networks, it is important to be able to encrypt 
and authenticate messages sent among sensor nodes. Due to resource constraints, achieving such 
key agreement in wireless sensor networks is nontrivial. Blom’s scheme is a symmetric key 
exchange protocol used in cryptography. But the concerns with Blom’s scheme are the 
complexity involved in computation as well as memory usage. In this paper, we propose a new 
key pre-distribution scheme by modifying Blom’s scheme which reduces the computational 
complexity as well as memory usage. 
 
Introduction 
Key exchange schemes for sensor networks are a subject of continuing interest and one of the 
techniques used includes Blom’s scheme and its variants [1]-[6]. The key distribution method 
proposed by Blom allows any pair of nodes in a network to be able to find a pair wise secret key 
[7]. This network consists of N nodes termed as N users and a collusion of less than λ+1 users 
cannot reveal the keys which are held by other users. λ which is the threshold is treated as a 
security parameter i.e., the larger the threshold λ value the more secure the network. This 
threshold property of Blom’s scheme is a desirable feature because an adversary needs to attack 
a significant fraction of the network in order to achieve high payoff. Another usage of λ is that it 
helps in determining the amount of memory needed to store the key information. Higher the λ 
value leads to higher memory usage. The network is said to be secure as long as no more than λ 
nodes are compromised. This is called the λ- secure property.  
 
The working of the Blom’s pre-distribution scheme is described below. For context related to 
secure networks, error-correction, and implicit security see [8]-[11]. Since we know that the 
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Blom’s scheme was not developed for wireless sensor networks, modifications have been done 
to the Blom’s scheme to make it suitable for the wireless sensor networks.  
 
 
Blom's Scheme 
In the predevelopment phase, over a finite set of field GF(q), the base station constructs a matrix  
G of size (λ +1) x N. where N is the number of nodes, i.e., the size of the network and λ is the 
secure parameter. G is called the public matrix i.e., all the information of G is public 
information, which means every sensor node in the network can access the information of G and 
the same goes with the advisories. Next the base station, over a finite field GF(q), creates a 
symmetry matrix   called D of size (λ + 1) x (λ + 1). Now the base station computes (D.G)T 
which results in a matrix called A of size N × (λ + 1), where (D·G)T is the transpose of  D·G. 
Matrix D needs to be kept secret, and should not be disclosed to adversaries or any sensor node 
(although, as will be discussed later, one row of (D·G)T will be disclosed to each sensor node). 
Because D is symmetric, it is easy to see: 
A·G = (D·G)T·G = GT·DT·G = GT·D·G 
= (A·G)T ;  
 
From the above equation we can see that A.G = (A.G)T which means A.G is a symmetric matrix. 
Let us store the resultant of A.G in a new matrix called K. Since we know A. G is a symmetric 
matrix, we can say an element in K located at ith row and jth column is equal to an element in K 
at jth row and ith column i.e., Kij = Kji. Hence we use Kij (or Kji) as the pairwise key between 
node i and node j. Fig. 1 illustrates how the pair wise key Kij = Kji is generated. To carry out the 
above computation, nodes i and j should be able to compute Kij and Kji, respectively. This can be 
easily achieved using the following key pre-distribution scheme, for k = 1. . . N: 
 
1. store the kth row of matrix A at node k, and 
2. store the kth column of matrix G at node k. 
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Therefore, when nodes i and j need to find the pair wise key between them, they first exchange 
their columns of G, and then they can compute Kij and Kji, respectively, using their private rows 
of A. Because G is public information, its columns can be transmitted in plaintext. It has been 
proved in [4] that the above scheme is λ-secure if any λ + 1 columns of G are linearly 
independent. This λ-secure property guarantees that no nodes other than i and j can compute Kij 
or Kji if no more than λ nodes are compromised. 
 
 
        A = (D.G)T                                                 G    (D.G)TG 
 
𝑖1 𝑖2 . . 𝑖λ + 1
𝑗1 𝑗2 . . 𝑗λ + 1
       
𝑖1 𝑗1
𝑖2 𝑗2. .. .
𝑖λ + 1 𝑗λ + 1
      
𝐾𝑖𝑗
𝐾𝑗𝑖
 
 
 
Figure 1: Generating Keys in Blom’s Scheme 
 
Below is how a Matrix G looks like. A Vandermonde matrix is a matrix with the terms of a 
geometric progression in each row. And since we would like to achieve λ-secure property, any 
(λ+1) columns of G must be linearly independent in order. Since every element in the finite field 
GF(q) represents a pair-wise key, suppose the length of pair-wise key is 128, then q should be 
choosen in such a way that it is the smallest prime number that is larger than 2128. In a given 
finite field GF(q) where N<q let a be a primitive element of GF(q). So now each non zero 
element of GF(q) can be represented by some power of s. namely si for some 0 < i ≤ q − 1. A 
feasible G can be designed as follows [7]: 
   
N N 
 N 
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Figure 2: Public Matrix example 
 
We know that si ≠ sj if i ≠ j as this is the property of primitive elements. As we have already 
stated a Vandermonde matrix is a matrix with the terms of a geometric progression in each row, 
we can say that λ + 1 columns of G are linearly independent when s, s2, s3, . . . , sN are all 
distinct. In practice a primitive element s of GF(q) can generate matrix G. Hence any node when 
given a seed can generate the column, i.e., when we store the kth column of G at node k, we only 
need to store the seed sk at this node. 
 
Modified Blom's Scheme 
In this article, we make use of the Bloms scheme. As stated earlier the Bloms scheme makes use 
of Vandermonde matrix which is a public matrix and this matrix is responsible for all 
computations in generating keys and since it’s a public matrix, it could be known even to the 
eavesdroppers. We choose all the values or elements of this matrix to be distinct so that any λ + 1 
columns of G are linearly independent i.e., to generate unique keys. But when the value of λ 
increases to larger values, then the number of rows of the public matrix increase and this in turn 
results in greater value in the columns because the column values increases in a geometric series. 
We know in wireless sensor networks, sensor nodes contains limited memory and energy, where 
in Bloms scheme [4] for any two nodes to generate a common key, each node should store 
column of public matrix and row of the calculated secret matrix and this would be difficult for 
sensor networks to store both the row and column in the memory for a large network. 
 
To reduce the computation and memory overhead in Blom’s scheme, instead of using 
Vandermonde matrix [12] we propose the use an Adjacency Matrix as the public matrix. As, the 
Adjacency matrix is a square matrix with 1s and -0s, it reduces of complexity of calculating 
values for all the elements corresponding to the columns in Vandermonde matrix. This 
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Adjacency matrix is formed in such a way that all nodes that are neighbors of a particular node 
are filled with 1s and remaining with q-1(since public matrix cannot contain 0s). 
 
Another advantage of using Adjacency matrix is it reduces the cost of saving the columns in the 
memory of sensor because any node can easily generate Adjacency matrix of known size. 
Similar to Blom’s scheme the operation which are to be performed to generate the keys will 
depend on the prime number i.e., the number which depends on the desired key length. A normal 
Adjacency matrix would look like the one in figure 3 but our modified Adjacency matrix would 
look like figure 4. 
0101
1100
0001
1011
 
Figure 3: Adjacency Matrix 
 
281281
112828
2828281
12811
 
Figure 4: Changed modified Adjacency Matrix for Modulo 29 
 
 
The original binary form Adjacency Matrix is depicted in Figure 3. The only change that is made 
to the Adjacency Matrix is all zeros are replaced with the q-1(prime number -1). We can see 
from Figure 4 that the Adjacency Matrix consists of only two different numbers one’s and q-
1(prime number -1), hence all the further calculations will be very simple. Key generation 
technique is similar to that used in the Blom’s scheme [7]. Following are the steps involved in 
calculating the key. 
 
Step 1: Generating a G matrix. We first select a primitive element from a finite field 
GF(q), where q is larger than the desired key length (and also q > N), and then construct 
adjacency matrix G of size N ×N as discussed in the previous section depending on the 
node neighbors. Then depending on the λ value first λ rows along with N columns are 
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selected as the public matrix. Let G (j) represent the jth column of G, in Blom’s scheme G 
(j) is provided to node j but in our case each node knows its neighbors and therefore the 
memory usage for storing G (j) at a node is not required. 
 
Step 2: Generating key spaces. The Central Authority generates ω random, symmetric 
matrices D1, . . . ,Dω of size (λ+1)×(λ+1). We then compute the matrix Ai= (Di. G) T. Let 
Ai(j) represent the jth row of Ai. 
 
Step 3: Computing Secret Key. The central authority stores each row of the matrix A in 
the node memory with corresponding index. Now if node i want to communicate with 
node j then node i multiplies the row Ai with column Gj and the result will be the secret 
key. 
 
Implementation 
The following example shows the working of the modified Blom’s scheme using adjacency 
matrix. Let the number of nodes in the network be 6 (N=6), secure parameter λ =3 and prime 
number q=29 which says if no more than 3 nodes in the network are compromised it is not 
possible to find the keys of other users. 
Consider the node structure below: 
 
Figure 5: Node Structure Example 
The Adjacencymatrix for the Figure 4 is shown below 
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Modified Adjacencymatrix 
28128282828
1282812828
28282828128
2812828281
2828128281
2828281128
 
Public matrix (G) 
28282828128
2812828281
2828128281
2828281128
 
 
Secret Symmetric Matrix (D) 
4517
5392
1965
7253
 
 
A= (D.G)T mod 29 
1210812
22162616
14282022
26141818
524203
245926
 
 
Once matrix A is calculated each sensor node memory is filled with unique row chosen from 
matrix A corresponding to the same index. These rows represent the private keys of each node. 
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Key Generation 
Suppose let’s consider two nodes, node 2 and node 5 want to communicate with each other. In 
order to obtain the shared secret key, node 2 will multiply its private row which is provided to it 
by the Central Authority from matrix A which is A(2)with the public column of node 5 which is 
column 5 of G (G(5)). 
 
Similarly node 5 multiplies its private row A(5) with public column of node 2 G(2). In this way 
both node 2 and node 5 generate secret shared key for them to communicate. 
K2,5 = A2.G5 = 524203  
28
1
28
28
 = 808 mod 29 = 25 
 
K5,2 = A5.G2 = 22162616  
1
28
28
1
 = 1214 mod 29 = 25 
 
We observe that both nodes generate a common key and further communication between them 
will make use of the pair-wise key. 
 
In general matrix K can be represented as shown below and we can notice that the symmetric 
nature gives the same key for any pair of nodes such that Kij = Kji. 
K= A.P 
K = 
1176906960852528690
224018081538180812141106
235215961812175813801056
21281750164216429401264
145680891613751240268
17921657154910904421414
  
 
Simulation 
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In this paper, the effort required to make the computations is analyzed. The computational effort 
here is calculated as the number of minute operations required to complete one Standard 
Arithmetic Operation. In Blom's scheme the Standard Arithmetic Operation is Multiplication. 
When we multiply two numbers, say at least one number is a two or higher digit number, 
manually to get the final result we make a number of multiplications and additions (internally). 
We have performed analysis between the Bloms Scheme and the proposed scheme based on this 
computational effort. 
 
Figure 6: Computation Effort for 6 node structure 
 
Simulations are carried out with the network size of 6 nodes and 8 nodes under a finite field 
ranging from 0-50, 0-100, 0-150, 0-200, 0-250, 0-300, 0-350 considering some random node 
structure. Both these networks have been tested with different λ values, 3 and 6 respectively. 
This simulation is performed 10 times and the average results are taken in consideration. 
For the Blom's scheme we have generated the public and secret matrix by generating random 
numbers within the finite field. The same secret matrix is used for the Modified Blom's Scheme 
and the public matrix is formed by using the proposed scheme where the random number is also 
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generated randomly under the finite field. The results have shown the computational effort 
required by the Modified Blom's Scheme is less when compared to that of the Blom's Scheme.  
For the six nodes structure the difference between Bloms scheme computations and Modified 
Bloms scheme computations for each finite field is shown below: 
 
Figure 7: Difference between Bloms scheme and Modified Blom scheme 
 
Figure 8: Computation Effort for 8 node structure 
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For the eight nodes structure the difference between Bloms scheme computations and Modified 
Bloms scheme computations for each finite field is shown below: 
 
Figure 9: Difference between Bloms scheme and Modified Blom scheme 
From both the results we can observe that the effort required in case of Modified Blom’s scheme 
is less when compared to that of Blom’s scheme and also we can observe that as we tend to 
larger finite field, the gap between the computational effort is increasing. 
Conclusion 
Blom’s scheme is a symmetric key exchange protocol used in cryptography. But the concerns 
with Blom’s scheme are the complexity involved in computation as well as memory usage. This 
paper presents a new key pre-distribution scheme by modifying Blom’s scheme which reduces 
the computational complexity as well as memory usage. The analysis is substantiation by 
simulations carried on two networks with different node size and different finite fields. 
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